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Abstract
Points, lines and surfaces are the basic elements of Euclidean geometry. In this paper, accompanying a keynote at ICSC 
2018, we will explore how, in physics, cognition and our lived experience, it is often better to think in terms of intercon-
nected threads than an evolving state of the world now. In physics ‘now’ is an illusion, merely a convenient construction, 
each particle and person is more like an independent strand in space–time, and similarly, in our minds, strands of memories 
from different roles and contexts flow almost independently. Paths create lines on the map and may be inscribed as signs in 
the landscape, but our journeys along paths create temporal threads that interweave as we meet along the way. This paper 
draws on my research over many years on time and user interaction and also my personal experiences during a thousand-mile 
walk around the periphery of Wales in 2013.
Introduction
All roads lead to Rome: the Milliarium Aureum in the 
Forum marked the point from which distances were meas-
ured along the long roads that led in all directions. However, 
this is not simply a statement about one end point; it says 
to, not from. Roads are spatial, but journeys are temporal, 
with a beginning and an end. Furthermore, in Imperial times 
and for a millennium after, Rome was the centre of power, 
temporal and spiritual; the ‘to’ makes clear that one’s eyes 
should be cast towards its heart. Our conceptions of space 
and time are intimately interwoven with the social fabric of 
human life.
In 1996, at the AVI’96 conference in Gubbio, I gave my 
first keynote, which considered how sight, sound and smell 
create different cuts through space and time and call on 
memory in different ways to fill the void in current sensa-
tion. Twenty years on, at Talis, I studied the changing nature 
of physical text in a digital world. The written word takes 
a snaking line across the space of the page and through the 
volume of a book, preserving, prompting and promulgating 
memory.
During the Dark Ages, the laborious writing of Celtic 
monks on the Atlantic fringe was crucial to the continuity 
of knowledge. In 2013 I took my own winding route round 
the edges of Wales, exploring viscerally the relation between 
space, time and memory. This paper will link lessons from 
that one-thousand-mile path and 30-year study of time in 
user interaction.
In the eye of the beholder
Time is notoriously difficult to define.
Augustine of Hippo (AD 401) famously asked, ‘What 
then is time?’, and answered himself, ‘If no one asks me, I 
know: if I wish to explain it to one that asketh, I know not’.
It is obvious and yet an enigma.
Even today physicists struggle with an apparent contra-
diction. On the one hand, there is a clear large-scale ‘arrow 
of time’, the relentless increase in entropy. Yet this is set 
against the timeless quality of both quantum mechanical and 
relativistic accounts, within each of which all processes are 
reversible, and the distinction between past and future is no 
more than between left and right.
Augustine goes on to ask, ‘But time present how do we 
measure, seeing it hath no space?’
Of course, post-Einstein we see space and time as more 
intimately connected, capable of twisting into one another 
as easily as a compass needle shifts from south to west. Yet 
cognitively, in our lived human experience, seconds and 
metres are still as incommensurate as they were to Augus-
tine 1600 years ago.
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In any statement, the assumptions that underlie it are 
often more fascinating than the subject itself. Augustine’s 
‘how do we measure it?’ casts the problem as being the 
space-less nature of time, but thereby assumes that if time 
had spatial dimensions it would be unproblematic.
Is it really so clear?
Modern physics suggests that time is perhaps no more 
complex than space, but equally that space is no less com-
plex than time.
Andrew Parker (2004) argues that the Cambrian explo-
sion was due to the evolution of the eye. Before the eye, 
there were ways to sense at a distance; indeed a mole, while 
blind, can still navigate through the sense of smell. However, 
the ability to see at distance revolutionised both predator 
and prey.
At AVI’96 I explored the ways in which different senses 
give different ‘cuts’ through time and space (Dix 1996): 
vision cuts through space, telling us about what is happening 
now as far as the eye can see; for a dog, smell cuts through 
time, telling it about everything that has happened here back 
through the past until the scent fades; and for an echolocat-
ing creature like a bat, there is something in between, where 
closer things are known instantly, more distant ones after a 
delay.
Today, half of the human brain is dedicated to visual pro-
cessing, and this primacy of vision can effectively blind us 
to the world view it creates. Indeed, the previous sentence 
includes two metaphorical uses of ‘vision language’ in day-
to-day speech. Crucially our sight gives us a sense that space 
is simple, taken in at a glance. However, consider a sightless 
worm: the lawn that we survey in an instant is experienced 
predominantly temporally, traversed over hours. Indeed, in 
the days before satellites, distances too far to see or hidden 
by forest or hill would be measured not in metres or miles, 
but in the number of days’ walking it took to reach them.
There is an argument that both physically and cognitively 
time is more fundamental than space.
Not now
One of the fallacies of vision is the illusion of now.
The near-instantaneous travel of light means that we 
perceive a single glance as encompassing the world at a 
moment. This perception of ‘now’ in the immediate environ-
ment, the ‘here and now’, is perhaps as old as vision itself, 
but precise measurement of ‘now’ at a distance has emerged 
far more recently, and it is not clear when the idea of ‘now’ 
as a universal global snapshot emerged.
From early times sundials and sun sticks were used to 
measure the passing of time through the day. Later, town 
clocks replaced the sundial as the primary means to measure 
time, but were synchronised to the same movements of the 
sun: twelve noon was when the sun was at its zenith.
One of the revelations of a spherical earth, whether in 
a geocentric or heliocentric universe, is that the local sun 
time is not universal: noonday in Rome is more than an 
hour before noonday in Swansea. North–south this sphe-
ricity allowed sailors to measure their latitude through the 
azimuth of the noonday sun, but for many years longitude, 
east–west location, proved elusive.
The importance of this was sufficient that from the mid-
sixteenth century national prizes were offered for the person 
who cracked the problem of longitude. However, it was not 
until 1740 that John Harrison’s highly accurate chronometer 
solved the problem (Sobel 2005). The chronometer was set 
to a fixed time, notably the time at Greenwich, home of the 
British fleet, and kept time accurately over the length of a 
voyage. The further west you go, the later the sun rises, and 
the later it reaches its zenith. Thus, by simply noting the 
chronometer time at local noonday, it was possible to work 
out how far east or west you were; each hour delay in noon-
time corresponds to 15 degrees of longitude.
The Harrison chronometer not only meant that space was 
measured using time, but it also provided a highly accurate 
way of saying ‘now’ globally.
In the nineteenth century, railway companies began to 
find the local time of the town hall clock inconvenient. If 
trains were to adhere to strict timetables, it became impor-
tant that train guards were not constantly adjusting their 
watches to fit with local times. Initially each company cre-
ated their own unified time, and eventually national time 
zones were established, overriding local celestial time. In 
factories clocks were also installed, not just for punctuality 
of timetables, but to ensure a regulated workforce: the pat-
terns of summer and winter, dusk and dawn, ignored in the 
race for efficiency and control.
Time is not simply a matter of physics but an instrument 
of social and political engineering. Indeed, in 1940 General 
Franco shifted Spain’s clocks to Berlin time even though the 
sun rises more than an hour later in Madrid.
However, ‘now’ is an illusion, or at best an invention.
Newtonian physics is rather like lasagne. Imagine each 
layer is the state of all things in space at a single moment 
in time; below it lie past sheets of now, and above it fresh 
sheets are added each moment. The laws of physics specify 
how each layer gives rise to the next.
Einstein’s genius was in realising that there is no ‘now’, 
no universally meaningful sheet of present. Instead, rela-
tivity is more like a tangle of spaghetti: each of us carries 
our own clock, our own time, and our knowledge of space 
is limited to the proximate; we are but a thread through 
time–space. Sometimes our spaghetti threads lie alongside 
one another, and then we share our here and now, our clocks 
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progress in synchrony, but then, when our threads diverge 
there is no reason for our clocks to keep similar time.
Although we each carry our own time, we can attempt 
to create a universal now. Einstein envisaged doing this 
through communication: send a light beam from Swansea 
to Rome and then, when it arrives, send one straight back 
again. If Swansea records the light beam leaving at 12 noon 
precisely and receives the return beam at 12:00.014, we can 
assume that the light beam reached Rome precisely half-way 
between, at 12:00.007. By doing this, every point in space 
and time can be given a precise Swansea time, and each 
moment of Swansea time creates a hypothetical ‘now’.
This is effectively how time can be calibrated for practi-
cal purposes and, at day-to-day accuracies, our definitions 
of ‘now’ using this method agree. However, this is only an 
approximation. If our relative velocities differ, the defini-
tions we construct of ‘now’ also differ, albeit only noticeable 
when we travel at speeds that are substantial fractions of the 
speed of light. Your lasagne sheets of hypothetical ‘now’s’ 
criss-cross my sheets. Furthermore, each time you acceler-
ate or slow down, your sheets of hypothetical now, which 
spread out across the universe, swing back and forth like a 
child playing planes, running with arms outstretched. As 
we bank and turn, the hypothetical times we have for distant 
places may shift back and forth by aeons.
Of course for most speeds and scales, it is possible to con-
struct universally accepted ideas of ‘now’, but the physical 
lack of ‘now’ does call into question the extent to which this 
is a universal human concept. Psychology has been based 
predominantly on so-called WEIRD subjects (western, edu-
cated, industrial, rich, democratic), but comparative stud-
ies have found that what might be thought to be universal 
cognitive and perceptual phenomena are, in fact, sometimes 
shaped by culture (Henrich et al. 2010).
Is this true of ‘now’? Would a Neolithic hunter-gatherer 
have been able to think during the day, ‘I wonder what is 
happening back at the cave now.’?
Paths and journeys
In 2013 I walked the thousand-mile journey around the 
periphery of Wales: the mountains and meandering rivers 
of the eastern borderlands, and the fractal folded coastline 
of the north, west and south (Dix 2013a, b). The journey 
skirted the edges of what were once the world’s largest ports 
(the sea is the ultimate highway), past derelict industrial sites 
and of course rural communities at the economic and digital 
edges.
The route followed two existing paths: the long-standing 
Offa’s Dyke long-distance path, which runs up the eighth-
century border between Wales and England, and the then 
new Wales Coast Path, the first complete national coast path 
in the world.
The paths are drawn as lines on maps, but also inscribed 
in the landscape itself: arrows, finger signposts and small 
roundels on gateways and stiles. Crucially, on the more heav-
ily trodden parts of the paths, the way to go is implicit in 
worn tracks across the ground.
Tim Ingold (2007) highlights the modern Cartesian 
obsession with points in space: cities, towns, landmarks. The 
lines, the paths and routes between are seen as merely means 
of traversal. ‘All roads lead to Rome’—it is Rome, the desti-
nation, that is prime, not the road on which your feet tread.
Some of the wooden finger posts along the Offa’s Dyke 
Path and Wales Coast Path do give distances to the next 
major place along the way. Of course, on walking paths 
‘major’ may mean a tiny village, hilltop, bay or headland, 
but these still appear at first to share the Cartesian-centric 
focus of the motorway sign.
There is indeed an element of this: when you are looking 
for the next place to find food, or where you plan to sleep 
that night, these destinations are important. However, unlike 
the typical motorway driver you are not travelling the path 
in order to get to a destination; the destinations are merely 
the means by which you navigate the path. If you wanted to 
get from A to B, you would drive or take a bus; the purpose 
of a long-distance walking path is the walk.
Ingold has studied nomadic tribes for whom, like the lei-
sure walker, the focus on the point, the place, is incongruous 
and almost irrelevant. Ingold instead suggests foregrounding 
the line, the connection, the dusty path.
With such a view, Rome might be seen as merely the 
nexus at which roads happen to meet. This at first seems 
incongruous: the reason for the Roman roads is precisely 
to send legions back and forth from the Imperial centre to 
subdue the periphery and bring back the spoils. They truly 
are Cartesian lines of connection, cutting across the land-
scape, drawn arbitrarily across a map, with scant regard for 
landscape and topography. However, at another level the 
location of most established cities is precisely because they 
are at the intersection of routes: river mouths such as the 
Tiber for water transport, fords across rivers, passes between 
mountains.
Whether worn by use, drawn on a map or constructed by 
bulldozer, paths and roads are static and impersonal. Jour-
neys, from the Odyssey, Argonautica and Viking Sagas to 
the modern travelogue, are often about people, and indeed 
their personal stories and the land and sea paths that they 
traverse are as much about significant events as significant 
places.
On the paths around Wales, signposts were often simply 
two tiny arrows in opposite directions, saying ‘Offa’s Dyke’ 
or ‘Wales Coast Path’—one path, two directions, the only 
way you knew which one to follow was that the other pointed 
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backward along the way you had come. A path is static and 
spatial; a journey is dynamic and temporal.
I recall at one point (note the spatial language for a tem-
poral event), before I set off walking but after plans were 
laid, someone mentioned a place in Pembrokeshire. As the 
name was spoken I noticed myself instantly thinking of 
it as ‘late June’—I had already internalised the route and 
approximate timeline, and for me the spatial organisation 
of the coast had become a temporal organisation of my own 
journey along it.
People along the way
If a journey is personal, then for each traveller, the journey, 
even when taking the same route, is unique.
Geographers often distinguish space and place, a dis-
tinction that has also been adopted within human–com-
puter interaction (Harrison and Dourish 1996). The former, 
space, is used to refer to the Cartesian location or extent, 
the point on the map; however, when that location becomes 
flooded with social and historical significance, it becomes 
a place. Auge (1995) talks of non-places: shopping malls, 
service stations and airports, the soulless loci of moder-
nity. Yet these apparently mere points of passage are for 
some—the shopkeeper, ticket seller or cleaner—places of 
abode where life is lived. Even for the traveller they may 
be landmarks, meeting places, or, like the railway platform 
in Brief Encounter, where lovers tryst (Dix and Gill 2019).
Some years ago, I needed to set a design challenge and 
chose ‘absent presence’ (Dix et al. 2004). There are places, 
such as art galleries or a town centre at night, where you may 
be alone, and yet there have been others before you in the 
same spot, and others will come after you. How do you help 
people appreciate this absent presence?
For paths no less than places, people have trod before 
you; indeed, there are often the signs left behind: a footmark 
in the mud or a lost glove (Fig. 1). Yet you walk alone—the 
stories of these other travellers, the journeys that have briefly 
inhabited the path are at best guessed if ever even envisaged. 
Your own traces on the ground fade, the footmarks 
washed away or overlaid with others, the only remains the 
slight deepening of a rutted path or the gloss on well-trod-
den stones. Often the trace that persists is on paper in dia-
ries and journals, or digitally on the web: lines of text and 
photographs.
On my journey I took 19,000 photographs, approximately 
one every 100 metres, and wrote more than 150,000 words 
of blog, approximately one character for every second step. 
In addition, the walk produced the largest ECG trace in the 
public domain as well as other data, all time-stamped: per-
sonal record and automatic sensing linked through time.
A colleague, Stavros Asimakopoulos, analysed my blogs 
using grounded theory methods, inductively building con-
cepts and themes from the raw words (Asimakopoulos and 
Dix 2017). When he first showed me the results, I did not 
believe him. He said that the major constructs were around 
social engagement, and yet I knew that for virtually the 
entire time I had walked alone, some days barely meeting a 
single person. However, he was right. Although social inter-
actions were only a small part of the temporal experience, 
in my written reflective account, these human contacts took 
centre stage.
On reflection it became clear that while at any moment 
there was little or no social or technical component to the 
experience, simply the walking, once I expanded my view-
point there were onion layers of experience extending into 
time and space (Fig. 2).
Three broad classes of people became apparent.
Egocentric (people of life)—these were my personal 
contacts (family, friends and professional colleagues), who 
during the walk were principally connected virtually and 
remotely.
Geocentric (people of the land)—these were the shop-
keepers, bed and breakfast owners, or simply local people 
met in the various villages, towns and cities through which 
I passed.
Tribocentric (people of the way)—these were the fellow 
walkers and travellers, who I met briefly, a few walking long 
distances like myself, other simply on days’ out or holidays.
These differ in the ways in which we meet and connect 
along the way, but the ‘people of the way’ are most inter-
esting in the context of this paper: those with whom we 
momentarily cross paths, or maybe walk alongside for a 
while—just like the strands of spaghetti-like existence in 
relativity.
Fig. 1  Signs left behind (photograph: author, see Dix 2013a, day 4)
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Cognition: is all knowledge spatial?
In previous work I have explored the relationship between 
the ways we build childhood understanding of significant 
places and the routes between them, and the way in which, 
as adults, we create interconnected maps of ideas (Dix 
2009).
While our visual world is Euclidian (in 2 or 3 dimen-
sions) the world beyond our sightline is one of paths and 
landmarks, a network, not a map. Space syntax uses these 
broken sightlines as a way to structure space and finds that 
distance metrics based on changing sightlines offer a closer 
match to human activity than those based on Euclidean dis-
tance (Hillier 1996). Our larger spatial maps are networks.
Spatial and temporal metaphors are common in day-
to-day language (Lakoff and Johnsen 2003) and are also 
found repeatedly in the language of information: items in 
a data store, building upon past knowledge, navigating to 
locations on the web. Spatial understanding is clearly far 
more primitive than abstract concepts; indeed maze running 
experiments are performed on many kinds of animal, which 
we would not normally associate with high-level abstract 
thought. So it is unsurprising that spatial metaphors are 
powerful. It is less clear whether these are simply paral-
lels, or whether they reflect a deeper neurological reuse of 
aspects of the brain originally developed for spatial reason-
ing. However, it does appear that spatial-processing parts of 
the brain are recruited for mathematical reasoning (Dehaene 
et al. 1999), so this spatial reuse may be more widespread 
for other areas of intellectual life.
Whether or not there are neurological underpinnings, at 
very least the structural parallels between spatial and intel-
lectual landscapes offer heuristics to understand broader 
cognition (Dix 2009).
One example of this is the way linguistic, tribal, admin-
istrative and nation-state boundaries often lie along physi-
cal barriers such as rivers, sea coasts or mountain ranges. 
This is not unsurprising, since these form natural defences 
and natural barriers to movements of people. However, 
there are often equally substantial topographical features 
that lie wholly within a single geographic entity. The phys-
ical features create obvious places where human bounda-
ries may form, but which particular physical features 
become borders is tied to specific historical events. Nation 
boundaries sometimes even lie across open ground, such 
as the plains of central Europe, albeit that these unnatural, 
exposed borders are frequently the site of conflict.
This tendency for geopolitical boundaries to reflect 
natural features, while not being entirely determined by 
them, has parallels in our intellectual life. The nature of 
the world imposes or suggests particular conceptual break-
downs, such as by similarity or proximity, but which par-
ticular set of features emerges as the high-level ontology 
for a particular individual, culture or language depends 
on the exigencies of history. This is evident in the Dyir-
bal language’s category of ‘Women, Fire and Dangerous 
Things’, which Lakoff (1987) highlights in his book of 
the name.
Fig. 2  Onion layers of social 
connections and technology use
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Memory: interwoven threads
Returning to the sensory cuts through time and space 
in the AVI’96 keynote (Dix 1996), memory also plays a 
central role. When a dog smells one tree trunk and then 
moves to another, its knowledge of the second tree trunk 
through time is generated directly by its current smell, but 
its knowledge of the first tree trunk and its history of smell 
has to be committed to memory. Similarly when we look 
out we get a (near) instantaneous impression of a wide 
area of space at an instant, but we rely on our memory for 
what was happening within our vista at a previous time. 
That is, a creature of vision determines spatial information 
with senses and projects backwards in time with memory, 
but a creature of scent determines temporal information 
with senses and projects outwards in space with memory 
(Fig. 3).
In truth all of us are mixtures of the two: as we turn 
our head we rely on memory to tell us what is behind, and 
even what appears to be a momentary glimpse of the world 
ahead is in fact the accumulation of numerous saccades, 
giving detailed information about different parts of the 
image, which we unconsciously piece together to give the 
perception of a visual field. Furthermore, what we seem 
to see is often a combination of what we actually sense 
and assumptions built upon previous experience, so that 
memory constructs the present as much as it reconstructs 
the past.
In computing we also deal with memory: the state of the 
machine: registers, stacks and program counters; RAM, 
hard disks and ‘the cloud’. State is critical, it is our only 
route to the past, but in coding it is often implicit in vari-
ables, the current line of code and call history. Because of 
this novice programmers often have a less clear model of 
the state they are creating than physicists brought up on 
lasagne models of the world. This is crucially important 
in event-based programming, whether it is user-interface 
code in a web page, web transactions or low-level concur-
rent or distributed systems. It is interesting to see the way 
patterns from state-less functional programming (which 
therefore needs to deal with state explicitly) are being used 
in both massive-scale big-data parallelism (MapReduce) 
and event-driven JavaScript UI code (monads).
There are many parallels between computational memory 
and human memory. This is partly because they are effec-
tively trying to solve similar ‘problems’ and partly because 
computer models of memory are often inspired by (assumed) 
models of human memory. Indeed, in my own previous work 
with various colleagues we have extended this to include 
parallels with memory social and organisational systems 
(Dix et al. 1998, Dix 2002), asking questions such as ‘what 
happens to the organisational program counter when the 
lights go out at night?’ These parallels are powerful, but 
may occasionally be false friends; the largely sequential 
and linearly structured nature of classical computation may 
not reflect the more associative nature of subconscious 
cognition.
In a computer we often model temporal data as time 
series, with a value recorded at regular points of time, or 
as events ordered by time of occurrence. Is this the way 
thought works?
Fig. 3  Different senses give different cuts through time, space and memory. Left: Visual perception, centre: Nasal perception, right: Whales and 
astronomers. (from Dix 1996)
Fig. 4  Walking and ‘normal’ life in clock time
S107Cognitive Processing (2018) 19 (Suppl 1):S101–S108 
1 3
I was walking for 3 months (Fig. 4) and after a period I 
became ‘the walking man’, it was hard to imagine that there 
had been any existence other than walking or that walking 
would not go on for ever. However, when the walk finished 
it was frightening how quickly I got back ‘to normal’—none 
of the life changing transformations we are led to expect of 
the grand expedition.
However, for some time afterwards I noticed an odd dis-
location of time. One manifestation of this was the way that 
memories of walking almost seemed to be of a different 
person. In some ways this was like becoming ‘the walking 
man’, a shift of personal identity, of habits and expectations. 
Models of memory often deal with schemas, and the period 
of walking was clearly a very different schema to day-to-day 
life, hence a feeling of otherness.
However, the more disturbing dislocation was a broken 
perception of duration. Time and again I would think that 
some event had happened recently, in the past few months, 
only to realise it was half a year ago. There is the classic 
trope of ‘years flying by’ as you grow older, but this was 
more dramatic.
After a while the reason became apparent. I had been liv-
ing ‘normal’ life and then did something unusual. When I 
returned to normality my mind had stitched together the time 
before the walk with the time after, so that I had effectively 
‘lost’ 3 months of normal life (Fig. 5). My perception of 
past time was not based on how far back it was in a universal 
timescale (even a personal one), but on how far back in ‘nor-
mal life’ time. It is rather like visiting friends you haven’t 
seen for a while, or a much frequented holiday destination; 
it is as if ‘you have never been away’.
Haliyana Khalid studied photologging sites (like Flickr), 
where users post, share and comment on photographs. 
Through this study we became aware of a wider phenom-
enon, which we called extended episodic experience (Khalid 
and Dix 2010).
Often, accounts of user experience focus on a specific 
moment or episode: attending a concert, drinking a bottle 
of wine, using a word processor. This may include prepara-
tion and anticipation before the event, or recollection and 
reflection afterwards (McCarthy and Wright 2004), but is 
still focused on the singular event.
The users’ accounts of their photologging suggested a 
more temporally extended view, where past experiences of 
photologging, the user’s own reactions to another person’s 
post or other people’s comments on theirs influenced future 
decisions; and where the current experience of posting was 
based on anticipation of future events. These episodes of 
experience thread together, like pearls on a string.
In Einstein’s physics we saw that we are each like a single 
strand of spaghetti, a thread of existence.
Cognitively it seems our memories are more like multiple 
strands, a thread for each different kind of existence: one for 
home life, one for work, one for holidays, one for our journey 
to work, etc. These are not aligned by universal time; they 
are not like the GPS, ECG, accelerometers and EDA traces 
of my walk data, connected by timestamps. Instead they are 
almost independent, each carrying their own duration, their 
own past and future, connected only through points where 
two threads share a common event.
Benford et al. (2009) talk about trajectories, the way we 
may each experience the timeline of a game or dramatic nar-
rative at different paces so that when you or I read the same 
book, we experience the same time point in the story at a 
different personal time, or even in a different order.
It seems that our own internal lives are not so different. 
The threads of our memory are bound by the external arrow 
of time, our personal spaghetti strand trajectory. They can-
not loop back on themselves, but they can divide and merge, 
meet at points or diverge, sometimes even find themselves 
cut adrift.
This has important lessons for the technology we use for 
personal information management: for example we might 
consider representing threaded time explicitly. Perhaps more 
critically, all developed nations are facing a crisis of ageing, 
where dementia and memory loss are key factors for quality 
of life and cost of care.
The walking man seems far away: a story I was told, more 
than a memory. Once separated from the day-to-day remind-
ers of walking existence, those external physical representa-
tions that we know are critical to us as embodied creatures 
(Clark 1998; Varela et al. 1991), the thread of the walk 
becomes separated, floating free, hard to hold on to. How 
much worse for those whose memory is already threadbare, 
who are taken into ‘care’ away from the constant reminders 
of recent life. It is no wonder that the fabric of personality 
unravels.
Reweaving
So, our memories lie intertwined, our experiences more like 
a braid than a single thread; and in physics too we are inter-
woven, each a strand; we knit together with one another to 
make this thing we call reality. The three-dimensional cut Fig. 5  Separate threads of memory
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through four-dimensional space–time that we call ‘now’ is 
as much an artifice as the map that purports to be the truth 
on the ground, but is cut across by boundaries and places. 
And yet for us as social creatures, our lives, our stories inter-
woven define these places, and the paths that tread place 
to place create connection from isolation. The threads of 
our memories are connected through events, the threads of 
paths connect at places and the journeys we each take, drill-
ing through time and space, meet, when we are fortunate, 
at moments of human contact, which give points in space 
significance and make them places, and give our lives sig-
nificance and make them human.
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